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WHEN IT MATTERS MOST, 
IT IS STILL THE 
KENNEDY COURT 
Erwin Chemerinsky† 
CTOBER TERM 2007 will be most remembered for a 
few high-profile cases that dealt with issues of enor-
mous legal and social significance: the meaning of the 
Second Amendment,1 the right of individuals impris-
oned in Guantanamo to have access to the federal courts,2 the abil-
ity of a state to impose the death penalty for the crime of child 
rape.3 Not surprisingly, each of these cases was decided by a 5-4 
margin with Justice Anthony Kennedy in the majority. 
Simply put, on issues that are defined by ideology, the conserva-
tive position prevails in the Roberts Court except when Justice 
Kennedy joins with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
Occasionally this term, Justice Stevens or Justice Breyer joined with 
the five most conservative Justices to create a 6-3 or 7-2 vote for a 
                                                                                                    
† Erwin Chemerinsky is Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Cali-
fornia, Irvine, School of Law. 
1 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). 
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
3 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008). 
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conservative result.4 But never did one of the four most conserva-
tive Justices – Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito – vote for a more liberal result in a case defined by ideol-
ogy.5 The bottom line is that when the Court is divided 5-4 on is-
sues where there are clear liberal and conservative positions, Justice 
Kennedy is the swing vote. 
This term, though, there were fewer cases defined by ideology 
and fewer 5-4 decisions than in the first two years of the Roberts 
Court. In October Term 2007, there were 14 decisions that were 
resolved by a 5-4 or 5-3 margin, compared with 24 cases the year 
before. There were more instances than in prior terms of the Rob-
erts Court where criminal defendants and employees won impor-
tant victories. I do not think that this indicates a shift in the ideology 
of the Court or the Justices, but rather reflects what was on the 
docket this year. 
One other overall theme is important: in some key areas, the 
Court rejected facial challenges to state laws, but left open the pos-
sibility of “as applied” challenges. For example, in Crawford v. Marion 
County,6 the Court, without a majority opinion, upheld an Indiana 
law for voter identification based on the record before it. Similarly, 
in Baze v. Rees,7 the Court, again without a majority opinion, upheld 
the three-drug protocol used for lethal injection based on the re-
cord before it. But in both cases, the Court’s rejection of a facial 
challenge left open the possibility of a different result on a more 
developed record. In each instance, the lack of a majority opinion 
will confound lower courts as they deal with the almost certain fu-
ture litigation. 
                                                                                                    
4 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008) (upholding the three-drug protocol 
for death by lethal injection); Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 
S.Ct. 1610 (2008) (upholding a state law requiring photo ID in order to vote). 
5 There was one case in which Justice Alito did join with Justices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg: Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S.Ct. 1931 
(2008), which held that federal employees may bring retaliation claims under the 
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  
6 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008). 
7 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008). 
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SECOND AMENDMENT 
he case that understandably received the most media attention 
was District of Columbia v. Heller, which concerned the constitu-
tionality of a 32-year-old District of Columbia ordinance which 
prohibited possession of handguns and imposed significant restric-
tions on long guns. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, invali-
dated the ordinance as violating the Second Amendment. 
There long has been a debate about the meaning of the Second 
Amendment, which provides: “A well regulated Militia being neces-
sary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” One side of the debate sees 
the latter clause as being key and interprets the Second Amendment 
as creating an individual right to possess firearms. The other side of 
the debate emphasizes the first clause and says that it is a right only 
for purposes of service in the militia. 
The Court split 5-4 between these interpretations, choosing the 
former, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. He carefully 
traced the history of gun rights, in England and the United States, 
and said that the Second Amendment recognizes an individual’s 
right to have firearms, especially in the home for the purpose of 
self-defense. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, also care-
fully looked at this history and came to the opposite conclusion, 
arguing that the text and history of the Amendment make clear that 
it protects a right to have firearms only for purposes of militia ser-
vice. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion can be understood only through 
an ideological prism. Conservatives long have favored gun rights 
and Justice Scalia took this position, even though it required him to 
abandon the conclusions that should have followed from his tradi-
tional methods of constitutional interpretation. The case thus pow-
erfully demonstrates that Justice Scalia’s constitutional rulings, de-
spite his professions to the contrary, ultimately are animated by his 
conservative politics.  
His opposition to abortion rights, his hostility to all forms of 
race-conscious remedies, his desire to allow school prayer and aid 
T 
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to parochial schools, and his supporting of gun rights all come not 
from a method of constitutional interpretation, but a conservative 
political agenda. Unless one believes that the framers’ intent and 
the contemporary Republican platform are identical, Justice Scalia’s 
decisions cannot be seen as reflecting an originalist method of con-
stitutional interpretation.  
In fact, had Justice Scalia been true to his own interpretive phi-
losophy, rather than his conservative politics, he would have had to 
come to the opposite conclusion and find that the Second Amend-
ment protects a right to possess firearms only for purposes of ser-
vice in the militia. First, Justice Scalia repeatedly has emphasized 
the importance of focusing on the text in interpreting legal docu-
ments.8 Justice Scalia could find an individual right to have guns 
only by effectively ignoring the first half of the Second Amendment. 
Yet, a cardinal rule of interpretation is that every clause of a provi-
sion must be given meaning. Justice Scalia interprets the Second 
Amendment as if it said, “The right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms shall not be infringed.” But that’s not what the provision says. 
The only way to give meaning to both clauses is to conclude that the 
Second Amendment protects a right to have firearms only for pur-
poses of militia service. 
Justice Scalia says that the first half of the Second Amendment is 
the prefatory clause and the second half is the operative clause, and 
that a prefatory clause never can negate an operative clause.9 But 
that is circular. Both halves of the Second Amendment are “opera-
tive.” The first half negates the second only if one starts with the 
conclusion that the Second Amendment protects a right to possess 
weapons apart from militia service.  
Second, Justice Scalia has said that if there is ambiguity in the 
text, it is important to look to the original meaning at the time the 
provision was adopted. James Madison drafted the Second Amend-
ment, as he did all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. His initial 
draft of the Second Amendment included a provision providing an 
                                                                                                    
8 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997). 
9 128 S.Ct. at 2788-89. 
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exemption from militia service for those who were conscientious 
objectors. It provided: “The right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia 
being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military 
service in person.”10 The inclusion of this clause in the Second 
Amendment strongly suggests that the provision was about militia 
service.  
Third, Justice Scalia could come to his conclusion only by aban-
doning stare decisis. Every prior Supreme Court decision interpret-
ing the Second Amendment, and every federal court of appeals de-
cision until a few years ago, had rejected the view that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to have guns other than 
for militia service. 
In United States v. Miller,11 the Supreme Court declared that the 
Second Amendment was limited to safeguarding possession of fire-
arms for militia service. The Court upheld a federal law prohibiting 
possession of sawed-off shotguns, explaining that they were not 
weapons used in militia service at the time the Bill of Rights was 
ratified. The Court was clear that it believed that the Second 
Amendment was about protecting a right to have firearms for mili-
tia service: 
With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and ren-
der possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration 
and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It 
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view. … 
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears 
from the debates in the Convention, the history and legisla-
tion of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved 
commentators.12 
Fourth, in opinion after opinion, Justice Scalia has professed the 
need to defer to elected officials and railed against judicial activism 
                                                                                                    
10 Creating the Bill of Rights 12 (H. Veit, K. Bowling & C. Bickford eds. 1991). 
11 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
12 Id. at 178. 
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of Justices substituting their own views for those of legislatures.13 
The District of Columbia law invalidated by the Court had been on 
the books for 32 years. It was the product of a popularly elected 
legislature.  
But despite all of this, the conservatives on the Court found the 
District of Columbia law unconstitutional. In doing so, they showed 
that the conservative rhetoric about judicial restraint is a guise that 
is used to oppose rights they don’t like. When it serves their politi-
cal agenda, conservatives, such as Justice Scalia, are very much the 
activists. 
There is no doubt that this decision will lead to challenges to 
countless federal, state, and local laws regulating firearms. Two 
issues will be key in this litigation. First, what regulation of guns 
will be allowed under what circumstances? Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion was clear that the Second Amendment does not create an 
absolute right. He said, for example, that the government certainly 
could regulate where guns would be allowed and could keep some 
individuals (such as those with criminal records or histories of seri-
ous mental illness) from having firearms. However, the majority 
opinion did not specify the level of scrutiny to be used. This will be 
crucial as lower courts hear challenges to criminal and regulatory 
statutes dealing with firearms. 
Second, does the Second Amendment apply to state and local 
governments? Never has the Second Amendment been found to 
apply to other than the federal government and the Court did not 
deal with this issue in Heller since a District of Columbia law was at 
issue. Already challenges have been brought to gun control ordi-
nances in San Francisco and Chicago, and the Supreme Court will 
need soon to resolve this issue. 
ENEMY COMBATANTS & ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
n Boumediene v. Bush,14 the Supreme Court held that non-citizens 
held as enemy combatants, including those imprisoned in Guan-
                                                                                                    
13 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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tanamo, have the right to bring habeas corpus petitions in federal 
court. Since the first detainees were brought to Guantanamo in 
January 2002, the Bush administration has vehemently argued that 
federal courts lack the authority to hear their habeas corpus peti-
tions. After the Court rejected this argument in Rasul v. Bush,15 
Congress adopted the Detainee Treatment Act and then the Mili-
tary Commission Act to preclude such federal jurisdiction. 
The Military Commission Act provides that non-citizens held as 
enemy combatants shall not have access to federal courts via a writ 
of habeas corpus or otherwise, except that if there is a military pro-
ceeding, the detainee may seek review of the outcome in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
In a 5-4 decision, with Justice Kennedy writing an opinion 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court 
held that the preclusion of habeas corpus jurisdiction was unconsti-
tutional. Justice Kennedy explained that Article I, § 9 of the Consti-
tution allows Congress to suspend habeas corpus in times of rebel-
lion or invasion. Neither was claimed to be present. Moreover, the 
Court concluded that the remedy provided, review in the D.C. 
Circuit, did not substitute for habeas corpus. 
The majority and the dissent articulated vastly different views 
about the role of the federal courts during the war on terrorism. 
For the majority, the Constitution – and access to the federal courts 
to enforce it – are essential even in times of crisis. From this per-
spective, the decision was a profound reaffirmation of the rule of 
law. For the dissent, the decision was dangerous judicial meddling 
in a realm properly left to President and Congress. Justice Scalia 
said he believed that people would needlessly die because of the 
majority’s opinion.16  
In the short term, the most important effect of the decision is to 
allow hundreds of suits by Guantanamo detainees to go forward. I 
                                                                                                    
15 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
16 Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s 
opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder 
on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”). 
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have been representing a Guantanamo detainee – Salem Gherebi – 
for the last six years. He has been given no meaningful due process 
of any sort. There is no foreseeable end to his detention. He is a 
father of three who grew up in Libya, though he has never met his 
third child. His wife was pregnant when he was apprehended in Af-
ghanistan. Maybe he is a dangerous man who should be held; maybe 
the government made a mistake and he should have been released 
years ago. That is what due process is all about, making sure that 
there is a neutral judge to determine whether a person should be 
incarcerated. 
Justice Scalia may be right that someone released could commit 
terrorist acts. But every time a person is released from custody for 
inadequate evidence, there is the chance that individual will commit 
crimes and people will die. That, of course, never has been taken as 
allowing indefinite detention without due process. Nor should it be 
a basis for indefinite detention of enemy combatants without a sem-
blance of due process.  
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 
riminal defendants fared better this year than in many recent 
terms. There were two major death penalty cases, one of 
which was a victory for those on death row. In Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana,17 the Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed 
for the crime of child rape. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court 
in a 5-4 decision, held that a person may be sentenced to death only 
for the intentional killing of another. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion said once more that the de-
termination of what is cruel and unusual punishment is based on 
“evolving standards of decency.” He noted that only six states allow 
the death penalty for child rape and none have executed a person 
for the crime in the last several decades. He said that the goals of 
the death penalty, in terms of deterrence and retribution, would 
not be served by allowing such executions. 
                                                                                                    
17 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008). 
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It is notable that this is the same majority that held a few years 
ago in Roper v. Simmons that the death penalty cannot be imposed for 
crimes committed by children.18 It seems clear that these five Jus-
tices – Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer – will pre-
vent expansion of the death penalty and will limit its use. This, of 
course, could change dramatically if any of them are replaced by 
individuals with views like those of the four dissenters. 
In Baze v. Rees,19 the Court upheld the three-drug protocol used 
for lethal injections in most states that have capital punishment. The 
decision was 7-2, though there was no majority opinion. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, writing for the plurality, held that to constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment, a method of execution must present a 
“substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of unnecessary suffer-
ing. The Court said that a state’s refusal to adopt an alternative pro-
cedure is unconstitutional only where the procedure is feasible, 
readily implemented, and significantly reduces the risk of substan-
tial pain. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment and 
said that the method of execution does not violate the Constitution. 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and expressed reserva-
tions about the three-drug protocol, saying that it would not be al-
lowed in veterinary medicine, and questioned whether the death 
penalty ever can be constitutionally administered. Surprisingly, he 
nonetheless voted with the majority based on precedent and the 
record before the Court. 
The decision was based on the record before the Court concern-
ing the risks from Kentucky’s method of execution. The door re-
mains open to challenges to lethal injection based on more devel-
oped records that show a substantial or objectively intolerable risk 
of harm from the drugs used for lethal injections.  
From the perspective of day-to-day practice in federal courts, 
two decisions early in the term concerning criminal sentencing 
were among the most important. In Gall v. United States,20 the Court 
                                                                                                    
18 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
19 128 S.Ct.1520 (2008). 
20 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007). 
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held that (a) federal courts of appeals are to review sentences under 
an abuse of discretion standard, and (b) district courts must justify 
deviations to facilitate appellate review, but there need not be ex-
traordinary circumstances to justify sentences outside the ranges 
provided under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In Kimbrough v. 
United States,21 the Court applied this to hold that district courts 
may use their discretion in sentencing to alleviate the substantial 
disparity in sentencing for crack as opposed to powder cocaine. To-
gether, these cases show that the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Booker,22 is enormously important in its holding that the federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, and courts of ap-
peals should uphold sentences so long as they are reasonable. 
Kimbrough is likely to be especially important in empowering district 
courts to alleviate the terribly unjust disparities that exist between 
crack and powder cocaine sentences. 
One other criminal procedure case is quite important. In Giles v. 
California,23 the Court held that a criminal defendant does not “for-
feit” his or her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights upon 
a showing that the defendant caused the unavailability of a witness. 
Four years ago, in Crawford v. Washington,24 the Court held that a 
prosecutor may not use testimonial statements against a criminal 
defendant if the witness is unavailable at trial and the statements are 
reliable. The issue in Giles was whether there is an exception to 
Crawford in a situation where the defendant killed the witness and 
thus caused the person’s unavailability to testify. 
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court and found in favor of the 
criminal defendant. The Court said that there must be more than a 
showing that the defendant’s actions are responsible for the unavail-
ability of the witness; there also must be a showing that the defen-
dant’s actions were undertaken for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from testifying. This is a case likely to have significant im-
                                                                                                    
21 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). 
22 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
23 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008). 
24 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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plications in domestic violence and child abuse cases. These are the 
areas where often witnesses are least likely to be available to testify 
at trial, as the facts of Giles illustrate. Limiting the use of statements 
by the victim often will make convictions difficult, if not impossi-
ble. 
Together, these cases show that in some areas of criminal proce-
dure – especially sentencing and the Confrontation Clauses – ideol-
ogy does not predict outcomes. The conservatives on the Court, 
such as Justice Scalia, have taken the lead in these areas in expanding 
the rights of criminal defendants. 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
t also was a surprisingly good year for employees in employment 
discrimination litigation. In two cases, CBOCS West Inc. v. 
Humphries,25 and Gomez-Perez v. Potter,26 the Court made clear that 
laws prohibiting employment discrimination include a claim for 
retaliation, even if that is not provided in the statutes, unless Con-
gress expressly specifies otherwise. In CBOCS, the Court held that 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contract-
ing, includes a cause of action for those alleging retaliation based on 
race. Similarly, in Gomez-Perez, the Court held that the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act protects federal employees from 
retaliation, even though the statute expressly provides this only for 
employees in the private sector. 
In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,27 the Court held that 
an employer defending a disparate impact claim under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act bears both the burden of produc-
tion and the burden of persuasion for showing that the decision was 
based on “reasonable factors other than age.” This is an important 
victory for plaintiffs in age discrimination suits. 
                                                                                                    
25 128 S.Ct. 1951 (2008). 
26 128 S.Ct. 1931 (2008). 
27 128 S.Ct. 2395 (2008). 
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BUSINESS LITIGATION 
verall, the Roberts Court is quite pro-business and that was 
reflected in a number of its decisions. I think that it is the 
most pro-business Court since the mid-1930s. For example, in 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,28 the Court ruled in favor of manufacturers 
of medical devices and held that approval by the Food and Drug 
Administration under the Medical Devices Act preempts state tort 
and breach of warranty claims. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court 
in an 8-1 decision, concluded that a provision in the Act preempting 
state regulation of devices approved by the federal government also 
preempts states from allowing liability. Justice Ginsburg was alone 
in dissent in arguing that the statute preempts only regulation and 
not liability and that the Court should follow the traditional pre-
sumption against preemption. 
In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,29 the 
Court held that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
SEC Rule 10b-5 do not allow a plaintiff class of investors to main-
tain a civil cause of action against vendors who participated in a 
scheme to inflate a public corporation’s stock price where the ven-
dors made no public statements upon which the plaintiffs relied. 
This ruling, by a 5-3 margin, is an important win for businesses in 
limiting their liability under federal securities law. 
Once more, the Court limited punitive damages, though this 
time on very narrow grounds in a case of great significance. What is 
most important about the Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping 
Company v. Baker is that it is just about punitive damages in maritime 
cases.30 The Court was clear and emphatic that it was not relying on 
the Constitution and, in fact, it denied certiorari on Exxon’s consti-
tutional challenge to the punitive damage award against it. 
The case arose from the tragic oil spill on March 24, 1989, when 
the Exxon supertanker Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef off the Alas-
                                                                                                    
28 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008). 
29 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008). 
30 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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kan coast, fracturing its hull and spilling millions of gallons of crude 
oil into Prince William Sound. The tanker was over 900 feet long 
and was used by Exxon to carry crude oil from the end of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Valdez, Alaska, to the lower 48 states. On 
the night of the spill it was carrying 53 million gallons of crude oil, 
or over a million barrels. The case before the Court was an action 
brought by commercial fishermen, native Alaskans, and individuals 
dependent on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods for the 
devastating economic losses they suffered. 
The accident was the result of the drunkenness and errors of the 
captain, Joseph Hazelwood. The federal court jury awarded $5 bil-
lion in punitive damages against Exxon. The case was twice re-
manded by the Ninth Circuit in light of Supreme Court decisions 
concerning constitutional limits on punitive damages. Ultimately 
the Court of Appeals approved a $2.5 billion punitive damages 
award.  
The Supreme Court said that it was ruling only on the scope of 
punitive damages in the narrow context of maritime cases. How-
ever, Justice Souter’s reasoning was less about maritime law and 
more about the need for predictable and consistent rules for puni-
tive damages awards. Justice Souter said that the solution for this is 
to limit punitive damages to a one-to-one ratio with compensatory 
damages: 
Accordingly, given the need to protect against the possibil-
ity (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards 
that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deter-
rence or for measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1 
ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper limit 
in such maritime cases.31 
Since this is based entirely on the Court’s power to fashion federal 
common law, Justice Souter noted that Congress could overturn it. 
The one-to-one ratio caused the Court to lower the punitive dam-
ages from $2.5 billion to $507 million. This reasoning could apply 
                                                                                                    
31 Id. at 2633. 
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in other areas of federal common law where punitive damages are 
awarded. But this is a relatively narrow category of cases and the 
decision should have no impact outside of these areas. 
VOTING RIGHTS 
n Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,32 the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a requirement for photo iden-
tification in order for a person to vote. There was no majority opin-
ion for the Court as there was a 3-3-3 split among the Justices, with 
six voting to allow the regulation. 
Justice Stevens wrote for two other Justices – Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy. He said that in evaluating laws regu-
lating the election process, courts should engage in a balancing test, 
weighing the justification for the state’s rule against the burdens on 
voters. He said that Indiana’s requirement for photo identification 
served important purposes: deterring and detecting voter fraud and 
enhancing voter confidence in the electoral system. On the other 
side of the balance, he said that the burden on voters was minimal. 
He stressed that on the record before the Court, there was no evi-
dence that the Indiana law kept people from voting. He explained 
that it is relatively easy to get photo identification and those without 
it can cast a provisional ballot and then verify their identity at their 
county seat within a short time after the election. 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and was joined by Jus-
tices Thomas and Alito. He said that Justice Stevens’s opinion did 
not pay enough deference to state electoral processes and that state 
laws regulating the electoral process should be invalidated only if 
they have a “severe” impact on the right to vote. He advocated the 
“application of a deferential ‘important regulatory interests’ stan-
dard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict 
scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote.”33 
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer. He said that by the district court’s estimate, 
                                                                                                    
32 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008). 
33 Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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one percent of Indiana voters, primarily poorer voters and voters of 
color, would be kept from casting ballots. He estimated this at 
43,000 and detailed the obstacles to receiving photo identification 
and casting provisional ballots. On the other side of the balance he 
said that Indiana produced no evidence of a voter fraud problem of 
the sort that photo identification would solve. 
The decision is very troubling. Previously, the Court had ruled 
that laws which keep some citizens from voting must meet strict 
scrutiny. For example, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,34 the 
Court used strict scrutiny and held that a $1.50 poll tax is unconsti-
tutional, even though it would keep only a small number of voters 
from casting ballots. Nor is there a tradition of deference to states 
when there are restrictions on the right to vote. It is impossible to 
reconcile Justice Scalia’s deferential approach in Crawford with his 
vote, and the Court’s decision, in Bush v. Gore.35 
Such deference seems particularly inappropriate when a law is 
clearly motivated by partisan politics. All of the Republicans in the 
Indiana legislature voted for the law and all of the Democrats 
against it. This was not coincidence, as the law has a far greater 
harmful impact on Democrats than Republicans. 
Moreover, the Court’s aversion to allowing a facial challenge 
means that a law like this must go into effect and disenfranchise vot-
ers at an election in order to be challenged. Justice Stevens’s major-
ity opinion stressed the lack of proof that individuals were kept 
from voting. There certainly is the possibility of future challenges to 
such laws if there is proof that they keep a significant number of 
people from voting. 
CONCLUSION 
s I write in July 2008, the November presidential election 
looms. What is it likely to mean for the future of constitu-
tional law? In all likelihood, it will produce a Court that is ideologi-
cally the same as the past term or is more conservative. A more lib-
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eral Court is unlikely. The vacancies between January 20, 2009 and 
January 20, 2013 are likely to come from one side of the political 
aisle. Justice Stevens turned 88 in April of this year and it seems 
unlikely that he will be on the Court in 2013, the year he turns 93. 
There are always rumors that Justice Ginsburg might retire and that 
Justice Souter wants to go home to New Hampshire. 
By contrast, John Roberts is 54 years old. If he remains Chief 
Justice until he is 88, he will be Chief Justice until 2042. Clarence 
Thomas and Samuel Alito have yet to turn 60. Both Antonin Scalia 
and Anthony Kennedy turn 72 this year. 
Thus, the five conservative Justices are likely, absent unforeseen 
events, to remain another decade. If it is President McCain replac-
ing Stevens or Souter or Ginsburg, the Court surely will become 
more conservative. If it is President Obama, the Court will likely 
stay the same as it is now – a Court where when it matters most, it 
is the Anthony Kennedy Court. 
 
 
 
 
